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Judicial Protection of Minority Groups
Under the Weimar Republic
By

EDWIN M. SIERADZ*

The story of the German Weimar Republic is of more than academic interest to Americans. Wilson's fourteen points rang in the momentous event of its birth, and with its open or veiled overthrow, that
chain of hectic events began which finally saw America's entry in World
War II.
For the American lawyer especially, Germany under the Weirmar
Constitution offers a great deal of interest. Some of its achievements,
for example, its system of sbcial security and its compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes, might justify closer study with an eye to'"getting a
few points." In other respects the history of the Weimar Republic is
an account of total failure; but even then worthwhile knowing, if only
to make us see its shortcomings so that we may avoid similar blunders.
It is the purpose of this paper to record the history of one such
failure, the inability of judicial machinery to protect loyal democratic
groups within Germany against aggression by ribald and pugnacious
law violators. Some conclusions to be drawn from this tragic failure
are of immediate interest to us. A few examples will illustrate the type
of controversy involved.
In the book of a professed "military expert" it was charged that
the Freemasons were guilty of the German defeat in 1918. In great
detail and with much "documentary evidence," the author asserted that
*Mr. Sieradz was born in Germany in 1903. He received from the University of
Berlin the LL.B. degree in 1930 and the J.D. degree in 1933. He acted as private
secretary to Dr. Albert Einstein while studying law and became an assistant instructor
in law in the University of Berlin in 1931. continuing as such until 1933. when be
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one Lieutenant Henschke, under orders of the Freemasons, suppressed an
order given to him by his commander for delivery to another army unit,
and that this breach of duty caused that fateful gap in the Marne front
which finally enabled the Allies to break through in 19 18.
Or the Stuermer (Stormer), that disgrace to all newspapers, might
falsely disclose to the world that a certain Catholic statesman, just back
from Rome, went there to get the Pope's orders on how to run Germany.
and that he had vowed to act in maiorem papae qloriam only, with utter
disregard of German interests.
Or the Schwarze Korps, the paper of Hitler's Elite Guard, would
hire an unscrupulous physicist to "prove" that Einstein's theory of relativity was nothing but a particularly vicious Jewish attempt to confuse
German minds, and then to utilize the general disorder to gain domination of Germany.
What were the possibilities given by the law to deal with such
odious vilifications?
Generally speaking, there were three ways: police action (which.
however, was limited by the "act protecting the freedom of the press"),
a civil action by the aggrieved party, or criminal prosecution.
Under the famous Section 10, Part 2, Title 17, of the Preussisches
Allgemeines Landrecht (General Statutes for the Prussian States),
which dates back to Frederick the Great, and under other provisions
similar in scope, the police had the right to act whenever and however
necessary to preserve public safety and good order. Ordinarily it could
address itself only to the one responsible (der stoerer) for a disturbance.
This provision, it would seem, was broad enough to give the police appropriate authority to intercede in almost any case of public disturbances, and in many respects it was liberally construed. But the Borkurnlied (Borkum song) case is a good example of what the highest Prussian
court in the field of administrative law did to that good old statute when
it came to the protection of a group.
The inhabitants and guests in the summer resort Borkum had somehow contracted the habit of singing a vile text to the tune of a German
folksong, harmless in itself. The substituted words openly advocated
violence against certain groups within the German population. The
song came to be known all over Germany in this deteriorated form as the
Borhumlied. In fact, practically no one, including this writer, could
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remember the original words. The local band, to please its rowdy listeners, closed every concert by playing this infamous song, knowing, of
course, full well that the audience would lugtily blare the obnoxious
text. The court raversed an order of the local police prohibiting the
band from playing the tune because, it said, not the band, but the crowd
were the ones who caused the disturbance. The tune, it opined, was all
right. Was it the band's fault that the audience used it as a basis for
unlawful utterances?
Well, I think it was, and many outstanding German jurists thought
so, too.
It was in the field of criminal prosecution where the shortcomings
of court action as a means in the fight against group discrimination were
most pronounced. This was not the fault of the law itself, which was,
before court interpretation narrowed its scope, inclusive enough to give
adequate protection, as the following survey will show.
Where a person made derogatory statements of fact or of opinion
to the aggrieved party himself or to third persons, he was criminally
liable for a Beleidigung, which crime is broader than the common law
"criminal libel," inasmuch as it includes opinions and unpublished
statements regardless of whether oral or written., The weakness of these
broad prohibitions, as far as group protection was concerned, was that,
according to the German Supreme Court, they did not apply to the libeling of a group as such. A man could therefore insult "the Jews," "the
Catholics" or, as was done frequently, "the German judges" without
fear of criminal responsibility. It was only where the defamatory remark
imputed a derogation of individuals that the sanction of the law could
be invoked. The decisions holding one way or the other can hardly be
reconciled. It has, for example, been consistently held that derogation of
"the German judges" or "the Jews" was group defamation and, therefore, not within the protection of the defamation laws. On the other
hand, a man has been penalized for saying that "all German World War.
Corporals were Himmelstosse," referring to the repulsive character of
Corporal Himmelstoss in Remarque's well known novel, All Quiet on
the Western Front.
I do not see on what sound distinction this difference in the results
can be based.
'PENAL CODE, Sec. 185. et seq.
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The preaching of group hatred would often violate Section 130 of
the German Criminal Code, which made it a criminal offense to "incite
violence in a manner dangerous to the public peace." This section was
being vigorously applied under the Kaiser, against any reformer or
social-democrat who made statements even faintly approaching a suggestion of violence. But the courts were strangely reluctant to apply it
in any effective way when reactionaries urged to "kill the November
criminals" (i. e., the leaders of the German revolution in 1918), or to
'kill the Jews."
This writer was present, working as an "intern" in the District
Attorney's office, at a trial against certain adolescents who had been
indicted for shouting "kill the black pigs," meaning the Catholic Zentrum Party, and "kill the Jews." The case against those accused seemed
as clear as possible. But the court acquitted the defendants for "lack of
evidence" that the individuals before the court had participated in the
shouting. Now the defendants had admitted that they were members
of the group which had united for just the purpose of such unlawful
demonstration, and to anyone familiar with conditions then prevailing
in Germany, including the judge, it was a perfectly absurd idea that just
these boys should have kept their mouths shut while everyone else
around them was roaring.
When "God" or any essential' institution of an incorporated religious community were attacked, the offender might have been criminally
liable for "publicly blaspheming God with offensive expressions."-2 But
this statutory provision was no more effective than were the ones to
which we have previously referred.
It is almost impossible to give even a vague idea of the vile denunciations of especially the Jewish and Catholic faiths which were commonplace in such books as those of the Nazi "philosopher" Rosenberg,
The Myth of the 20th Century, or in the outright pornographic
Pfaffenspiegel (Parsons' mirror). No sound imagination would be fertile enough to invent such stories as there "reported," ranging all the
way from Catholic conspiracies to rape any and all female confessors, to
Jewish ritual murders.
But convictions for such flagrant law violations were not frequent,
and the penalties exacted were too light to serve as a deterrent.
"PENAL. CODE, Sec. 166.
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Since many of the active foes of the Weimar Republic also were
apostles of group hatred, the "Act for the Protection of the Republic,"
enacted in 1922 after Rathenau's assassination, could and did for a while
effectively, though indirectly, serve as a basis to protect group rights.
Among its provisions was one making the slandering of deceased German
statesmen a criminal offense. 3 This innovation had become necessary
because those violent rabble rousers used to smear in a perfectly incommunicable manner the memory of certain republican statesmen. One of
their pet hates was Erzberger, Catholic secretary of the treasury, assassinated in 1921. Their technique was to use the fabricated misdeeds of
those defenseless men as a means of inciting hatred against the groups
of which they were members, and thereby undermine the republic which
those groups supported.
For a while this act served adequately to protect the republic, and
the groups supporting it, against the specific type of slander or violence
banned by the act. But here again an interesting case of "wearing off"
is to be noted. The courts again began their corrosive work, and after
a while it was possible to call the Weimar Republic the "Jewish Republic" without running counter to the law. Such designation, clearly intended to discredit the Weimar Republic in the eyes of the reactionaries,
was held ordinarily not to constitute a defamation of the republic within
the meaning the statute.
It is only fair to note that the fiasco of group protection by criminal
or police action was not experienced when group protection by a civil
action for injunctional relief was sought. When a businessman tried to
improve his fortune by advertising that fie owned the "only German
store in town," or when he urged not to buy from a competitor because
of the latter's group affiliation, the courts would enjoin such action on
the authority of Section 826 of the Civil Code (the German version of
the Roman Actio doli), or under the "act prohibiting unfair competition." It is, indeed, a claim to glory of the German Supreme Court that
as late as 1938, five years after Hitler's accession to power, it dared declare
such a business practice unlawful. And it does not detract from this
exhibition of courage that the party prevailing in that suit could hardly
make use of its judgment, for the simple reason that the sovereign Ges'Sec. 5. No. 3.
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tapo, unperturbed by such legalistic whimsicalities, could and would not
allow the victor to stand on his documented right.
These examples naturally raise the question of how this over-all
fiasco of group protection by court procedure can be explained in a nation
which produced jurists of such international renown as Savigny, Ihering,
Gierke, Liszt, to name only a few? And also, can a lesson be learned
from this failure for the United States citizens in their fight for civil
liberties and human decency?
The answer is not a simple yes or no; it is complex, as is the problem involved. But a few conclusions may be securely drawn.
The failure of group protection under the Weimar Constitution
was partly due to conditions peculiarly German, which would not bc
encountered in this country if we were to try to fight group discrimination by concerted court action. Here are some of them:
The Weimar Republic inherited almost in toto the reactionary
judiciary and executive officers of the monarchy. Those men, in their
outspoken or unconscious antagonism to the republic, were naturally
disinclined to give force to the laws directed at the protection of the
republic or of the groups supporting it. As many of these groups seeking
court action had been denied their full measure of civil rights under the
monarchy (e. g., the "Order of the Jesuits," the "Social-democrats," and
factually, though not in law, the Jews), and were given full equality
under the republic, the judges considered questions of group rights a
political rather than a legal controversy. They, therefore, were reluctant
to brand a man a criminal and throw him into jail for what appeared
to them a disputable political credo rather than a criminal act.
Another peculiarly German feature telling against judicial effectiveness in the fight against group discrimination were the frequent general
pardons granted under the Weimar Republic. A convicted law breaker
had an excellent chance never to serve his term nor to pay his fine. These
amnesties naturally deprived a conviction of whatever deterrent effect it
might have otherwise had.
Another frequently employed means to beat the law was to make a
member of parliament the so-called "responsible editor" of a newspaper
bent on Jew-baiting or dissemination of other group hatred. Under the
screen of the editor's parliamentary immunity, the paper could lustily
violate every law on the books without having to worry about criminal
liability.
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The number of lawbreakers who in one way or another managed
to keep out of prison is legion. Among them are Joseph Goebbels, then
editor of the Angriff (Attack) , and Streicher, editor of the wildest
Notwithstanding numerous flagrant
pornographic sheet imaginable.
breaches of the law and even occasional convictions, they never had to
serve a term.
While the circumstances just stated, telling against effective court
action, were peculiarly German and would not necessarily be encountered if in this country concerted court proceedings were tried as a means
to fight group discrimination, there is at least one additional weakness
in such a course which is inherent to it and can hardly be eliminated
anywhere.
The conviction of the rabble rouser, far from discrediting him in
the eyes of his followers or in those of most of the indifferent, gives him
the halo of martyrdom and thereby aids rather than harms his cause.
The publicity given him by the court trial, frequently swelled by newspaper reports, works in the same undesirable direction. Further, American courts might'be as reluctant as the German to convict a man as a
criminal for acts which, abhorred by the courts though they might be,
in most cases touched a sensitive area of political controversialness.
The conclusion then, to be arrived at on the basis of the foregoing,
is that court action must remain an exceptional means in the fight against
group incrimination and discrimination, because the problems involved
are political and educational in nature rather than justiciable.
I cannot close without citing the most glowing example of such
constructive group defense known to this writer.
In or about 1935, the Catholic bishops of Germany set out to
answer some of the assaults made on the church, especially those contained in the Nazi High Priest Rosenberg's book, The Myth of the 20th
Century. At a time when such an act might have meant death, this
body published a remarkable booklet, tearing apart those inane accusations with truly masterly scholarliness, with admirable clarity, in a
style which only the self-assuredness gained from centuries of victorious
survival can give. I do not believe that anyone who reads this pamphlet
could ever again fall for the cheap trash of the Streicher. Rosenberg and
other Nazi apostles.

